Venezuela Country Profile
General Information
Political Climate

Venezuela has for decades been characterised by great social inequality and rampant corruption, which have periodically led to a popular disillusionment with politics. This situation formed the basis for the election of President Hugo Chávez Frías in December 1998 on the promise of massive social reforms, nationalisation of strategic sectors, fighting corruption and a break from the long-ruling political elite, infamous for its interlocking system of privileges. Chávez's controversial policy of '21st century socialism' has led to radical political and social changes. Political unrest and deep social cleavages between supporters and opponents have been characteristic of Chávez's time in office. In the September 2010 parliamentary elections, Chávez's party won the majority of seats (90) in the National Assembly; despite this victory, the President failed to hold on to the two-thirds majority his party enjoyed in the Assembly, with the opposition getting as much as 59 seats. Until now, Chávez's government controlled the legislature, judiciary, the state oil company and the majority of state governments. Chávez remains very popular among the poor majority of Venezuelans, mainly because of his social programmes aimed at helping Venezuela's poor. On the other hand, he is extremely unpopular among the Venezuelan elite and business community. The opposition accuses the government of being undemocratic, disrespecting private property rights and inhibiting freedom of speech.
Public opinion concerning the level of corruption and the effectiveness of government anti-corruption efforts are fairly mixed in Venezuela. In Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer 2010, nearly 65% of the surveyed households perceive the government's actions against corruption to be 'ineffective'. According to the same report, 25% report having paid a bribe the previous year, while the police are reported to be the most corruption-prone public institution. Latinobarómetro 2008 (see English version) reveals that public distrust in the political system is very high. For example, public officials in Venezuela are believed to be highly corrupt, and the majority of respondents believe that the occurrence of corruption is more prevalent in the political system than in the general society. On the other hand, it also reveals that 39% of respondents believe that there has been 'some' or 'much' progress in fighting corruption and that the government's efforts to fight corruption are effective. Hence, Chávez's strong rhetoric against corruption seems to have had an effect on Venezuelans' perception of the problem: while most perceive the level of corruption to be an increasingly pervasive problem in the country, they also perceive government anti-corruption efforts and institutions as positively affecting the situation. Still, however, petty corruption is a large problem in the country, and both Latinobarómetro 2008 and the Global Corruption Barometer 2010 reveal that Venezuela ranks among the countries in the region where most households have been victims of corruption themselves.
Corruption is a significant problem in Venezuela, and a systemic culture of corruption exists at most levels of society. At state level, an increasing overlap between Chávez's United Socialist Party and the state has led to the abuse of public resources for electoral campaigns, according to the Bertelsmann Foundation 2010. Similarly, Freedom House 2010 points to the non-transparent administration of state resources when reporting that several large development funds are controlled by the executive branch without any oversight. According to Global Integrity 2009, the Comptroller General, which has the power to provide oversight of public funds, is controlled solely by the ruling party.
However, the fight against corruption is on the political agenda in Venezuela. Since his inauguration, Chávez has openly declared a zero tolerance policy towards corruption, which has been demonstrated by several public initiatives. His administration has passed an Anti-Corruption Law (in Spanish) in 2003 and established a number of agencies that are mandated to deal with corruption, gathered under an umbrella institution called Poder Ciudadano (in Spanish). However, despite the anti-corruption agencies' formal independence, the government has been criticised for interfering in their affairs in order to secure political support, and for using them as tools to investigate and prosecute opposition members. An example of this is the accusation by the Public Prosecutor's Office in March 2009 of former presidential candidate and mayor of Maracaibo, Manuel Rosales, for corruption and illicit enrichment. According to several sources such as Herald Tribune and Reuters, thousands of opposition supporters protested in Maracaibo against the attempt to arrest the opposition leader, claiming that it was a case of political persecution. Rosales fled to Peru where he was granted political asylum in May 2009. In June 2008, the opposition protested in Caracas after a top anti-corruption official unveiled a blacklist of people, primarily of opposition members, under investigation for corruption. The list could be used to bar key opposition candidates from running in future elections. However, critics claim that the ban is unconstitutional, as none of the individuals on the blacklist have been convicted of a crime. Incidents like these have made the opposition claim that the government uses its institutional anti-corruption set up to dispense with political opponents.
Business and Corruption
The management of Venezuela's oil wealth has been a dominant economic and political issue for most of the past 100 years. Venezuela has a huge investment and economic growth potential and its natural resource wealth has made it an attractive place to invest. Officially, Venezuela welcomes foreign investment and provides equal treatment to local and foreign companies. Nevertheless, political and regulatory uncertainty has seriously weakened Venezuela's capacity to attract foreign investment, as reported by companies in the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011. Other factors too, such as heavy bureaucracy and corruption, inhibit the business climate and should be noted by investors considering doing business in Venezuela. Similarly, the US Department of State 2011 reports that foreign direct investment in Venezuela has been lower in recent years than in most other Latin American countries, as a result of a cumbersome business climate as well as a restrictive legal framework in the country.
Companies operating in Venezuela have experienced a change in conditions under Chávez's presidency. After his re-election in late 2006, Chávez proclaimed that he would accelerate the drive towards '21st century socialism' by further nationalising the economy, and, according to the US Department of State 2011, some of Chávez' reforms have led to reduced property rights. The Bertelsmann Foundation 2010 also states, that property rights are not sufficiently protected in Venezuela, as the government has started taking over so called 'strategic interests' of the people, such in the areas of food production, processing and distribution, construction materials, utilities, media, telecommunications, buildings, real estate and hotels. Acting in 'the people's interest' the government requires no proof in order to seize private goods. Private investment has generally been deterred by this uncertain legal and regulatory framework, although many companies with existing investments in Venezuela have been recording high profits thanks to high economic growth.
Access to foreign exchange is a major barrier to trade in Venezuela. Foreign exchange control is administrated by the Foreign Exchange Commission (Comisión de Administración de Divisas - CADIVI), which authorises the purchase and sale of foreign currency. The Transparency International Global Corruption Report 2009 reports that the government's management of foreign currency makes access to foreign currency a cumbersome bureaucratic process. Applicants fulfilling all the requirements to obtain foreign currency might still have their application denied and there are no appeal mechanisms. The same report also reveals that CADIVI's officials allegedly request illegal commissions of up to 30% of the total value of the currency request in order to speed up the process.
Several sources indicate that corruption is a key constraint for doing business in Venezuela. In Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2010, the private sector scores 3.1 on a 5-point scale (1 'not at all corrupt' and 5 'extremely corrupt'). According to the World Bank & IFC Enterprise Surveys 2006, 40% of the companies surveyed identify corruption as a major constraint to doing business. They also cite transport security, customs and ports as serious problems for their business activities. The informal or shadow economy also continues to constitute a significant problem, according to the Bertelsmann Foundation 2010. For example, in the World Bank & IFC Enterprise Surveys 2006, more than one in five companies surveyed report that they identify the practices of competitors in the informal sector as a major constraint. Further, public procurement is tainted by corruption and lack of transparency; thus, the US Department of State 2011 reports that a great majority of public contracts are awarded without open competition, while Global Integrity 2009 reveals that political considerations prevail in most procurement cases. Foreign investors considering establishing themselves in Venezuela are generally advised to consult with experienced attorneys, to develop, implement and strengthen integrity systems, and to carry out extensive due diligence before committing funds or when already doing business in the country.
Regulatory Environment
According to Global Integrity 2009, Venezuela's regulatory environment continues to suffer from inefficiency, and companies investing in the country often face inconsistent application of regulations. Thus, cumbersome bureaucracy is a major constraint on business operations in Venezuela, presenting opportunities for rent-seeking and encouraging corruption. Similarly, business executives surveyed in The World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011 perceive government administrative requirements to be quite burdensome. Moreover, business executives also report that government policy-making is fairly opaque and that government officials usually favour well-connected companies and individuals when deciding on policies and contracts. Commercial regulations can be ambiguous and inconsistent, and the lack of transparency increases start-up and overall operational costs. Moreover, according to Freedom House 2010, the Chávez administration has done little to cut down on bureaucratic regulations or registration and licensing requirements. Given the often very time-consuming process of obtaining licenses, many companies resort to irregular methods in order to shorten the waiting time and hire an agent, a so-called 'gestor', with connection to decision-makers, as pointed out by Global Integrity 2009. This overall perception is corroborated by figures from the World Bank & IFC Doing Business 2011, which illustrate that, when compared to the regional averages, starting a company and obtaining business licences in Venezuela can be very time-consuming and bureaucratic. On the other hand, the process is relatively inexpensive and no minimum capital is required. According to the World Bank & IFC Enterprise Surveys 2006, almost 34% of senior management time is spent dealing with regulatory requirements and 34% of the surveyed companies identify licensing and permits as a major constraint for doing business.
According to the US Department of State 2011, the Venezuelan Constitution of 1999 (in Spanish) governing foreign investment in Venezuela generally gives equal treatment to local and foreign companies, except in certain sectors, such as media, engineering and pharmacy, in which Venezuelan nationals or the state must hold at least 80% of the equity. Nationalisation of important economic sectors of society is a high priority for the Chávez administration, and several sectors have already been subject to the nationalisation reform, most notably the oil sector. The Hydrocarbons Law (in Spanish) ensures that all oil production and distribution activities are the domain of the Venezuelan state. As a result, foreign companies already operating in this sector in 2001 had their operating agreements and licences invalidated, and royalties for certain projects were raised considerably. In 2007, foreign-owned companies operating in the Orinoco Belt, such as ConocoPhillips, Chevron, ExxonMobil, BP, Statoil and Total were forced into joint ventures with the state-owned oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA). These controversial regulatory measures have led to reluctance on the part of international oil companies to invest further in Venezuela. Foreign companies considering investing in Venezuela are advised to contact the Venezuelan Council for Investment Promotion (CONAPRI - Consejo Nacional de Promoción de Inversiones), which is a private non-profit organisation providing relevant information on investment legislation, registration requirements, visas and licences.
Venezuela's judicial system is accessible to foreign entities seeking to resolve investment disputes and foreign investors may pursue property claims through court. US Department of State 2011 reports that while the judicial system is often slow, inefficient and corrupt, foreign entities do not generally suffer discrimination in legal proceedings. Nevertheless, business executives surveyed in the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011 report that the judiciary is often politically influenced by members of government, individual citizens or companies. Venezuela is a member of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the New York Convention of 1958; however, there are special regulations that define which arbitration body Venezuelan state-owned companies can use. For instance, the 2001 Hydrocarbon Law prohibits the PDVSA from entering into agreements that provide for international arbitration. Access the Lexadin World Law Guide for a collection of legislation in Venezuela.





