The management of Venezuela's oil wealth has been a dominant economic and political issue for most of the past 100 years. Venezuela has a huge investment and economic growth potential and its natural resource wealth has made it an attractive place to invest. Officially, Venezuela welcomes foreign investment and provides equal treatment to local and foreign companies. Nevertheless, political and regulatory uncertainty has seriously weakened Venezuela's capacity to attract foreign investment, as reported by companies in the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011. Other factors too, such as heavy bureaucracy and corruption, inhibit the business climate and should be noted by investors considering doing business in Venezuela. Similarly, the US Department of State 2011 reports that foreign direct investment in Venezuela has been lower in recent years than in most other Latin American countries, as a result of a cumbersome business climate as well as a restrictive legal framework in the country.

Companies operating in Venezuela have experienced a change in conditions under Chávez's presidency. After his re-election in late 2006, Chávez proclaimed that he would accelerate the drive towards '21st century socialism' by further nationalising the economy, and, according to the US Department of State 2011, some of Chávez' reforms have led to reduced property rights. The Bertelsmann Foundation 2010 also states, that property rights are not sufficiently protected in Venezuela, as the government has started taking over so called 'strategic interests' of the people, such in the areas of food production, processing and distribution, construction materials, utilities, media, telecommunications, buildings, real estate and hotels. Acting in 'the people's interest' the government requires no proof in order to seize private goods. Private investment has generally been deterred by this uncertain legal and regulatory framework, although many companies with existing investments in Venezuela have been recording high profits thanks to high economic growth.

Access to foreign exchange is a major barrier to trade in Venezuela. Foreign exchange control is administrated by the Foreign Exchange Commission (Comisión de Administración de Divisas - CADIVI), which authorises the purchase and sale of foreign currency. The Transparency International Global Corruption Report 2009 reports that the government's management of foreign currency makes access to foreign currency a cumbersome bureaucratic process. Applicants fulfilling all the requirements to obtain foreign currency might still have their application denied and there are no appeal mechanisms. The same report also reveals that CADIVI's officials allegedly request illegal commissions of up to 30% of the total value of the currency request in order to speed up the process.

Several sources indicate that corruption is a key constraint for doing business in Venezuela. In Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2010, the private sector scores 3.1 on a 5-point scale (1 'not at all corrupt' and 5 'extremely corrupt'). According to the World Bank & IFC Enterprise Surveys 2006, 40% of the companies surveyed identify corruption as a major constraint to doing business. They also cite transport security, customs and ports as serious problems for their business activities. The informal or shadow economy also continues to constitute a significant problem, according to the Bertelsmann Foundation 2010. For example, in the World Bank & IFC Enterprise Surveys 2006, more than one in five companies surveyed report that they identify the practices of competitors in the informal sector as a major constraint. Further, public procurement is tainted by corruption and lack of transparency; thus, the US Department of State 2011 reports that a great majority of public contracts are awarded without open competition, while Global Integrity 2009 reveals that political considerations prevail in most procurement cases. Foreign investors considering establishing themselves in Venezuela are generally advised to consult with experienced attorneys, to develop, implement and strengthen integrity systems, and to carry out extensive due diligence before committing funds or when already doing business in the country.

According to Global Integrity 2009, Venezuela's regulatory environment continues to suffer from inefficiency, and companies investing in the country often face inconsistent application of regulations. Thus, cumbersome bureaucracy is a major constraint on business operations in Venezuela, presenting opportunities for rent-seeking and encouraging corruption. Similarly, business executives surveyed in The World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011 perceive government administrative requirements to be quite burdensome. Moreover, business executives also report that government policy-making is fairly opaque and that government officials usually favour well-connected companies and individuals when deciding on policies and contracts. Commercial regulations can be ambiguous and inconsistent, and the lack of transparency increases start-up and overall operational costs. Moreover, according to Freedom House 2010, the Chávez administration has done little to cut down on bureaucratic regulations or registration and licensing requirements. Given the often very time-consuming process of obtaining licenses, many companies resort to irregular methods in order to shorten the waiting time and hire an agent, a so-called 'gestor', with connection to decision-makers, as pointed out by Global Integrity 2009. This overall perception is corroborated by figures from the World Bank & IFC Doing Business 2011, which illustrate that, when compared to the regional averages, starting a company and obtaining business licences in Venezuela can be very time-consuming and bureaucratic. On the other hand, the process is relatively inexpensive and no minimum capital is required. According to the World Bank & IFC Enterprise Surveys 2006, almost 34% of senior management time is spent dealing with regulatory requirements and 34% of the surveyed companies identify licensing and permits as a major constraint for doing business.

According to the US Department of State 2011, the Venezuelan Constitution of 1999 (in Spanish) governing foreign investment in Venezuela generally gives equal treatment to local and foreign companies, except in certain sectors, such as media, engineering and pharmacy, in which Venezuelan nationals or the state must hold at least 80% of the equity. Nationalisation of important economic sectors of society is a high priority for the Chávez administration, and several sectors have already been subject to the nationalisation reform, most notably the oil sector. The Hydrocarbons Law (in Spanish) ensures that all oil production and distribution activities are the domain of the Venezuelan state. As a result, foreign companies already operating in this sector in 2001 had their operating agreements and licences invalidated, and royalties for certain projects were raised considerably. In 2007, foreign-owned companies operating in the Orinoco Belt, such as ConocoPhillips, Chevron, ExxonMobil, BP, Statoil and Total were forced into joint ventures with the state-owned oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA). These controversial regulatory measures have led to reluctance on the part of international oil companies to invest further in Venezuela. Foreign companies considering investing in Venezuela are advised to contact the Venezuelan Council for Investment Promotion (CONAPRI - Consejo Nacional de Promoción de Inversiones), which is a private non-profit organisation providing relevant information on investment legislation, registration requirements, visas and licences.

Venezuela's judicial system is accessible to foreign entities seeking to resolve investment disputes and foreign investors may pursue property claims through court. US Department of State 2011 reports that while the judicial system is often slow, inefficient and corrupt, foreign entities do not generally suffer discrimination in legal proceedings. Nevertheless, business executives surveyed in the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011 report that the judiciary is often politically influenced by members of government, individual citizens or companies. Venezuela is a member of the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) and the New York Convention of 1958; however, there are special regulations that define which arbitration body Venezuelan state-owned companies can use. For instance, the 2001 Hydrocarbon Law prohibits the PDVSA from entering into agreements that provide for international arbitration. Access the Lexadin World Law Guide for a collection of legislation in Venezuela.

Individual Corruption

The judiciary is among the most corrupt public institutions in Venezuela, as illustrated by Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer 2010. According to the report, nearly half of the surveyed households consider it as 'extremely corrupt', while a fifth reports having paid a bribe in 2009. Similarly, among the Latin American countries included in Latinobarómetro 2008 (see English version), Venezuela is the country where the largest percentage of respondents believes that it is possible to get a favourable sentence by bribing a judge.

Business Corruption

According to World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011, surveyed business executives have a low degree of confidence in the Venezuelan legal system. In general, business executives do not consider the legal framework for settling disputes and for challenging regulation to be efficient. Companies should be aware that the corrupt and inefficient judiciary poses a hindrance for settling commercial disputes in Venezuela, according to the US Department of State 2011.

Political Corruption

According to several sources, such as the Bertelsmann Foundation 2010, judicial independence has declined under President Chávez. The legislation allows the National Assembly to appoint and remove judges by a simple majority vote. Thus, this allows the Chávez government to use its majority in the legislature to obtain an overwhelming majority of seats on the Supreme Tribunal of Justice. The Supreme Court's Judicial Committee has the power to hire and fire temporary judges without cause and without explanation and, according to the US Department of State 2010, it has done so several times. In 2009, more than half of lower court judges were provisional and temporary.

An example of the judiciary's lack of independence is the arrest of judge Maria Lourdes Afiuni. According to the US Department of State 2010, in December 2009, Afiuni granted conditional release pending retrial to banker Eligio Cedeno, who was detained since 2007 on charges of embezzlement and flouting government currency controls and whose case had been annulled and reopened several times in different courts. Afiuni was arrested shortly after her ruling and detained on charges of corruption, aiding in the evasion of justice, abuse of power and conspiracy, and President Chávez demanded for her the maximum penalty of 35 years. In May 2010, despite the prosecutor's conclusion that Afiuni had not received money or anything else to approve the release of banker Eligio Cedeno, a tribunal ordered the prosecution of Afiuni on corruption charges. According to Associated Press, several critical voices, such as the Caracas bar association, state that the case demonstrates the weakness of the Venezuelan judicial system and the pressure that the executive branch puts on the judiciary.

According to Freedom House 2010, the courts rarely rule against the government and government officials accused of corruption almost never face trial. For instance, according to the US Department of State 2010, between October 2009 and October 2010 the Supreme Court rejected 90% of cases against the main governmental bodies, such as the Presidency, National Assembly, Comptroller General, and Prosecutor General's Office, and all 21 legal actions against President Chavez. 

The US Department of State 2008 reports that in 2008, a former attorney general Isaias Rodriguez was accused of paying a witness to give false testimony to implicate critics of the government in the case of a prosecutor who was killed in a car bomb explosion in 2004. After the witness confessed receiving VEF 1,075,000 from Rodriguez to give false testimony, the government reportedly reopened the case. According to El Universal, Rodriguez was appointed as Venezuela's ambassador to Spain in June 2009.

Frequency

The World Bank & IFC: Doing Business 2011:
- It requires an average of 29 administrative procedures and 510 days at a cost of 43.7% of the claim for a company to enforce a commercial contract in Venezuela.

- Comparative regional averages are 40 administrative procedures, 707 days and 31.2% of the claim.

World Economic Forum: The Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011:
- Business executives give the independence of the judiciary from influences of members of government, citizens, or companies a score of 1.7 on a 7-point scale (1 'heavily influenced' and 7 'entirely independent').

- Business executives give both the efficiency of the legal framework for private companies to settle disputes and to challenge the legality of government actions and/or regulations a score of 2 and 1.5 respectively on a 7-point scale (1 'extremely inefficient' and 7 'highly efficient').

Transparency International: Global Corruption Barometer 2010:
- Citizens give the judiciary a score of 4.1 on a 5-point scale (1 'not at all corrupt' and 5 'extremely corrupt').

- 49.1% of households surveyed consider the judiciary to be 'extremely corrupt'.

- Nearly 20% of households who had contact with the judiciary in 2009 report having paid a bribe.

Latinobarómetro: Annual Report 2008 (see English version):
- 54% of respondents in this public survey believe that it is possible to bribe a judge in order to get a favourable sentence. This is the highest percentage of all countries included in the survey.

Individual Corruption

The Venezuelan police are perceived to be the most corrupt public institution in the country, according to Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer 2010, where slightly less than two-thirds of the surveyed households consider the police as 'extremely corrupt', while more than a quarter report having paid a bribe in 2009. This is backed by the Latinobarómetro 2008 (see English version), which reveals that Venezuela is one of the countries in the region where most respondents believe that it is possible to bribe a police officer in order to avoid a fine or arrest.

According to the US Department of State 2010, corruption is a serious problem in law enforcement agencies. Police officers are generally poorly paid and receive minimal training. According to the report, more than 19,000 police or National Guard officers committed crimes between July 2008 and July 2009, of which over 4,200 involved corruption and over 1,300 extortion. According to an October 2009 assessment by the Interior and Justice Minister, police committed approximately 15-20% of the country's crimes. Although hundreds of investigations are carried out each year, impunity is still the rule as very few are convicted.

According to the report, also prison staff is prone to corruption, and extortion was common among prison guards and inmates.

Business Corruption

Police extortion of companies is not uncommon. According to the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011, companies identify Venezuela to perform poorly in relation to the reliability of police services to protect them from crime. Consequently, there has been an increasing reliance on private security to protect foreign companies and expatriate staff, particularly in the oil sector. Similarly, in the World Bank & IFC Enterprise Surveys 2006, more than half of the surveyed companies pay for security in Venezuela, while close to half of these companies identify crime, theft and disorder as major constraints to doing business in the country.

Global Integrity 2009 reports on a case of police extortion of a businessman who was under investigation by the National District Attorney. On pretext of searching for evidence police officers from the Corps of Scientific, Penal and Criminal Investigations entered the businessman's house and extorted him to pay VEF 6.000 to avoid troubles. After consulting with his attorney, the businessman accepted to pay off the officers in order to avoid that they planted false evidence that could damage his case.

Political Corruption

The US Department of State 2010 reports that corruption, abuse of power, and a culture of impunity plague the Venezuelan police. According to Global Integrity 2009, appointments to law enforcement agencies are sometimes based on non-professional criteria, and party loyalties may be considered in some cases. Furthermore, in practice the law enforcement agencies are not protected from the interference of the executive. Also, the report highlights that law enforcement officers may sometimes enjoy protection from criminal investigations. 

The US Department of State 2010 reports that the government uses police forces to repress political demonstrations and that President Chávez has in several cases tried to take over control with the police in cities or provinces led by the opposition. In December 2009, following the killing of two National Guardsmen in Tachira state, Chávez claimed that the police forces in Tachira and Zulia, whose governors are members of the opposition, had failed to control Colombian paramilitary activity and warned that he had ordered the Defense Minister to seize state police headquarters if they continued 'to openly defy the public authority'.

In 2003, Chávez refused to comply with a Supreme Tribunal of Justice ruling that ordered the return of control of the Caracas police force from the federal government to the city's mayor who belonged to the political opposition. The government alleges that the police force was repressing pro-government demonstrations, while Chávez's opponents claim that the decision to take over the Caracas police force undermined the autonomy of the civilian police.

Frequency

World Economic Forum: The Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011:
- Business executives give the reliability of the Venezuelan police services to enforce law and order a score of 2.1 on a 7-point scale (1 'cannot be relied upon at all' and 7 'can always be relied upon').

Transparency International: Global Corruption Barometer 2010:
- Citizens give the police a score of 4.4 on a 5-point scale (1 'not at all corrupt' and 5 'extremely corrupt').

- Over 63% of households surveyed consider the police to be 'extremely corrupt'.

- 28.5% of households who had contact with the police in 2009 report having paid a bribe.

Human Rights Watch: World Report 2009:
- Over 6,000 police and National Guard officials were implicated in alleged extrajudicial killings between 2000 and 2007; only over 1,140 had been charged, and only 204 convicted.

Latinobarómetro: Annual Report 2008 (see English version):
- 60% of respondents in this public survey believe that it is possible to bribe a police official to avoid a fine or arrest.

The World Bank & IFC: Enterprise Surveys 2006:
- More than 51% of companies surveyed pay for security in Venezuela.

- More than 47.7% of companies surveyed identify crime, theft and disorder as a major constraint on doing business.

Individual Corruption

Many citizens identify the process of obtaining licences and permits as corrupt, as illustrated by Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer 2010. Citizens sometimes report either offering or being required to pay a bribe in connection with obtaining permits, medical services or when dealing with the Venezuelan education system.

Citizens report that petty corruption is widespread, for e.g. in the form of a small 'fee' to avoid waiting in a long queue for an identification card.

Business Corruption

It is common for public officials to demand bribes in exchange for approving public utility supply contracts. The process of obtaining licences is also often expedited by facilitation payments and gifts to licensing authorities. Global Integrity 2009 reports that companies often resort to the use of an agent, a so-called 'gestor', with ties to decision-makers to cut down the time it takes to obtain necessary licenses.

Another area for corrupt practices is the business inspections conducted by government officials. Thus, Global Integrity 2009 reports that business inspections by government officials to ensure public health and safety standards are in practice usually carried out in an arbitrary and ad-hoc manner, and bribes are often paid by companies in return for favourable treatment or expedited processing.

Electricity theft is a major issue. It is estimated that around 25% of all electricity consumption is stolen. The greatest losses are suffered by state-owned generators.

Political Corruption

In May 2010, a former defence minister and a critic of President Chávez, Raul Baduel, received an eight-year prison sentence after being arrested in 2009 on corruption charges, according to a 2010 article by The Wall Street Journal. Baduel was charged with embezzling funds of the armed forces, abuse of authority, and other charges. The charges have been seen by the critics of the Chávez administration as politically motivated.

According to the US Department of State 2010, among the most notable examples of allegations of high-level corruption related to infrastructure was the so-called Pudreval scandal. Namely, in June 2010, the media revealed that thousands of tons of decomposed food intended for distribution through the government's subsidised food programmes were stored at government warehouses throughout the country. According to the report, the scandal implicated several high-level government officials, including the former vice president Ramon Carrizales, who were aware of large amounts of food waiting in the ports as early as January 2009. Despite calls from the opposition, NGOs and media for an investigation, charges were pursued only against three current or former employees of the PDVAL, the food import and distribution unit of the national oil company PDVSA. In June 2010, the PDVAL director, former executive director of operations, and former general manager were arrested on charges of speculation and detained. In December 2010, the Supreme Court annulled the proceedings and ordered a retrial in a different trial court. The investigation in relation to the Pudreval case continues.

Frequency

The World Bank & IFC: Doing Business 2011:
- Building a warehouse in Venezuela requires a company to undergo an average of 11 administrative procedures, taking an average of 395 days at a cost of approximately 227% of income per capita.

World Economic Forum: The Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011:
- Business executives give government administrative requirements (permits, regulations, reporting) in Venezuela a score of 2.1 on a 7-point scale (1 'extremely burdensome' and 7 'not burdensome at all' and the mean of the results of the 133 surveyed countries being 3.3).

Transparency International: Global Corruption Barometer 2010:
- 25.1% of households who had contact with registry and permit services in 2009 report to have paid a bribe.

- 6.4% of households who had contact with education system in 2009 report to have paid a bribe.

- 5.1% of households who had contact with medical services in 2009 report to have paid a bribe.

The World Bank & IFC: Enterprise Surveys 2006:
- 34% of surveyed companies indicate business licences and permits as a major constraint to doing business.

- 5% of surveyed companies expect to give gifts to obtain an operating licence, which takes almost 42 days on average to obtain.

- It takes 31 days on average to obtain a construction-related permit.

Individual Corruption

According to Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer 2010, only under a fifth of Venezuelan households point to the interaction with land authorities as an area where bribes are often demanded. Nevertheless, Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer 2009 revealed that a significant part of the surveyed households considered bribes to land authorities to obtain favourable decisions a 'very serious problem' and perceived land matters to be distorted by grand and political corruption.

According to a press release in May 2006 by the Human Rights Ombudsman, several peasants were killed and some were wounded between 1999 and 2006 because of their activities in defence of land claims, particularly after the Law on Land and Agrarian Development entered into force in 2001. The law allows the government to take over and redistribute land it identifies as unused. According to the Ombudsman, contract killers hired by private landowners appear to have been responsible for most of the killings. According to a 2007 New York Times article, more than 160 peasants were killed by hired gunmen in Venezuela between 2001 and 2007.

Business Corruption

According to the Bertelsmann Foundation 2010, even though the constitutional guarantees for private property exist on paper, they are not implemented consistently or safeguarded adequately. Similarly, the US Department of State 2011 reports that the government's seizure of land without paying compensation has discouraged investment in several key agricultural subsectors. Companies operating in Venezuela should also note that the government conducts 'inspections' of plants to determine whether they are in violation with Venezuelan law. According to the report, these inspections have also led to expropriation or nationalisation. The government claims to have seized 4.7 million acres of land since 1998.

Political Corruption

According to the US Department of State 2010, in May 2010, the Comptroller General made a statement where it criticised the Ministry of Public Works and Housing for mismanagement of public funds. Specifically, he cited one government investigation involving a project initiated in 2005 to build 12,000 prefabricated houses purchased from Uruguay. The investigation by the Comptroller General's Office found that the project had resulted in the completion of only 11 houses despite the disbursement of USD 71 million - nearly half the project's total. According to the US Department of State 2010, there is no information available about any government investigation or prosecution of those responsible. 

Frequency

The World Bank & IFC: Doing Business 2011:
- Registering property requires a company to pay a little over 2.2% of the property value on average and to go through 8 administrative procedures, which take an average of 47 days - well below the regional average of over 68 days.

World Economic Forum: The Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011:
- Business executives give the protection of property rights, including financial assets, in Venezuela a score of 1.8 on a 7-point scale (1 'very weak' and 7 'very strong').

Transparency International: Global Corruption Barometer 2010:
- 16% of the households surveyed reported to have paid a bribe to land services in 2009.

Transparency International: Global Corruption Barometer 2009:
- 50% of households consider grand or political corruption in land matters to be a 'very serious problem'.

- 40% of respondents consider bribes to land authorities to obtain favourable decisions a 'very serious problem' in Venezuela.

The New York Times: 'Clash of Hope and Fear as Venezuela Seizes Land', 17 May 2007:
- 5% of the population was estimated to possess 80% of the country's private land before a land reform was initiated in 2002.

- The government has seized over 3.4 million acres of land and resettled more than 15,000 families since 2002.

Individual Corruption

According to Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer 2010, only a small part of the surveyed households report having paid a bribe to tax officers the previous year.

Business Corruption

According to the World Bank & IFC Doing Business 2011, the costs and procedural burden of paying taxes in Venezuela are far greater than the regional averages. In addition, according to the US Department of State 2011, non-transparent tax regulations are a source of uncertainty to foreign companies operating in Venezuela. Furthermore, Global Integrity 2009 reports that, in practice, tax laws are not enforced uniformly and without discrimination in Venezuela, and tax evasion is not uncommon despite incentives, such as tax cuts. This environment of arbitrariness in tax regulations could create opportunities for corruption.

Political Corruption

According to Global Integrity 2009, political considerations play a role in the enforcement of tax laws. Opposition leaders, journalists and companies who are critical of the Venezuelan government are considered 'special contributors' who are regularly visited, audited and supervised by the National Customs and Tax Administration Service (SENIAT), while the administration is more lenient with less critical contributors. The problem of arbitrary tax regulations enforcement is also acknowledged by the OAS Inter-American Convention against Corruption Third Round Implementation Report 2010; according to this report, Venezuela needs more suitable measures to ensure that bribes paid to tax officials in return for favourable tax treatment are detected. 

Frequency

The World Bank & IFC: Doing Business 2011:
- A medium-sized company must make an average of 70 payments and spend 864 hours a year managing the administrative burden of paying taxes at a total tax rate of 52.6% of profits.

Transparency International: Global Corruption Barometer 2010:
- 7% of households who had contact with tax revenue authorities in 2009 report to have paid a bribe.

Latinobarómetro: Annual Report 2006 (see English Version):
- 45% of the Venezuelan households surveyed doubted that their tax money would be spent appropriately by the government.

The World Bank & IFC: Enterprise Surveys 2006:
- 22% of companies consider tax administration as a major constraint for their operations.

- 2.5% of companies expect to give gifts in meetings with tax inspectors.

Individual Corruption

According to Transparency International's Global Corruption Barometer 2010, more than a quarter of the surveyed Venezuelan households points to the interaction with customs as an area where bribes are often demanded.

Business Corruption

Venezuela's seas and airports are notorious for their high levels of red tape and corrupt practices. Corruption within the customs service is one of the greatest barriers to trade in Venezuela. According to the US Department of State 2008, companies should note that problems with approval of import permits and licences by relevant offices have occasionally led to delays and cancelled shipments.

Time-consuming bureaucracy related to trade across borders also opens the way for public officials to demand bribes. According to the World Economic Forum Global Enabling Trade Report 2010, trade in Venezuela is impeded by customs procedures, which remain largely inefficient. According to the report, exporting and importing require much time and paperwork to clear goods at the border, and the process is plagued by corruption and bribery.

Moreover, companies can expect routine visits from customs inspectors, as like in many other government sectors, customs inspectors hold considerable discretion in deciding which rules to enforce and to whom these should be applied. Thus, Global Integrity 2009 reports that, in practice, customs and excise laws are not always enforced uniformly or without discrimination, and some groups, most notably well-connected individuals or companies, are likely to evade customs and excise laws due to corruption and connections. The regulatory and institutional framework of customs administration thus remains a high risk area for corruption.

Political Corruption

According to Global Integrity 2009, political considerations also play a role in the enforcement of customs and excise laws. Thus, according to the report, custom and immigration agencies have been used by the Venezuelan government to intimidate opposition leaders and journalists who are critical of the government. 

According to Globovision, in 2006, the former Presidential candidate Roberto Smith revealed that private companies paid 'intermediaries', some of them former workers of the tax office Seniat, so that they would be exempted from paying custom duties. Smith presented e-mails, documents and bank statements showing that at least three people, all former workers of Seniat had managed to gain about USD 1 million in commissions.

Frequency

The World Bank & IFC: Doing Business 2011:
- Exporting a standardised shipment of goods requires 8 documents and takes an average of 49 days at a cost of USD 2,590 per container.

- Importing a standardised shipment of goods requires 9 documents and takes an average of 71 days at a cost of USD 2,868 per container.

World Economic Forum: The Global Enabling Trade Report 2010:
- Business executives give the efficiency of customs procedures (formalities regulating the entry and exit of merchandise) in Venezuela a score of 2.2 on a 7-point scale (1 'extremely inefficient' and 7 'extremely efficient').

- Business executives give the transparency of border administration (the pervasiveness of undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with imports and exports) a score of 2.1 on a 7-point scale (1 'common' and 7 'never occurs').

Transparency International: Global Corruption Barometer 2010:
- More than 28% of households who had contact with the customs authorities throughout 2009 report having paid a bribe.

The World Bank & IFC: Enterprise Surveys 2006:
- It takes more than 68 days on average to obtain an import licence.

- It takes an average of 14 days to clear exports through customs.

- 26% of companies identify customs and trade regulations as a major constraint.

Business Corruption

Companies intending to operate in Venezuela should note that corruption in relation to public procurement is common. According to the US Department of State 2011, companies report that corruption exists in government procurement processes, and companies are generally recommended to use a specialised public procurement due diligence tool in order to mitigate the corruption risks associated with public procurement in Venezuela.

According to the law, major public procurements should be advertised; however Global Integrity 2009 reports that this is not always the case in practice. Moreover, companies are in practice guilty of major violations of procurement regulations, such as bribery, are not prohibited from participating in future procurement bids. In practice, public procurement officials have a great deal of discretionary power over procurement processes. Companies should note that it is common among public procurement officials to demand commissions in exchange for awarding contracts.

In the process of nationalising the oil sector, private companies had their operating service agreements cancelled and were forced into joint ventures with the state oil company, PDVSA, without negotiation, according to the US Department of State 2011. Concerns have thus been raised over the respect for contracts.

Read more about public procurement and contracting under 'Public Anti-Corruption Initiatives' in the Initiatives section.

Political Corruption

According to the US Department of State 2011, the vast majority of government contracts are awarded without open competition. Moreover, government contracts are vulnerable to corruption because the tender process frequently lacks transparency, according to the report.

Examples of corruption cases include the Supreme Court judge Luis Velazquez, who has been investigated for taking kickbacks involving a new judicial building.

Read more about public procurement under 'Public Anti-Corruption Initiatives' in the Initiatives section.

Frequency

World Economic Forum: The Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011:
- Business executives give the diversion of public funds to companies, individuals, or groups due to corruption a score of 1.9 on a 7-point scale (1 'very common' and 7 'never occurs').

- Business executives give the favouritism of government officials towards well-connected companies and individuals when deciding upon policies and contracts a score of 2 on a 7-point scale (1 'always show favouritism' and 7 'never show favouritism').

Business Corruption

To make the country's agricultural sector more efficient in order to achieve food self-sufficiency, the government established an agricultural development fund known as Fondafa. The administration and disbursement of money from the fund have reportedly been influenced by corruption. According to official figures, despite a 50% increase in farm credits issued by Fondafa in 2005, the number of hectares planted nationwide rose by a paltry 1.4%, according to a July 2006 article by Newsweek. Investigations point to collaboration between corrupt bureaucrats and rural companies that have allegedly channelled Fondafa credits into phantom agricultural cooperatives.

Companies report that bribery is not uncommon when dealing with environmental inspections in Venezuela. For instance, Global Integrity 2009 reports that business inspections by government officials to ensure public environmental standards are often carried out in an arbitrary and ad-hoc manner, and bribes are usually extracted from companies in return for favourable treatment or expedited processing.

Political Corruption

Corruption within the state oil company PDVSA's employment of personnel and in the sale of oil is significant, according to Transparency International's Global Corruption Report 2006. High-ranking officers and advisors to PDVSA have been involved in scandals related to kickbacks and dubious land acquisitions without the government taking appropriate action. The PDVSA stopped publishing its annual financial statements in 2003, a lack of transparency that has drawn criticism from many quarters, including Global Integrity 2009. 

• Legislation: Venezuela has signed and ratified three important international anti-corruption conventions: the UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), the OAS Inter-American Convention Against Corruption and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. The country has an anti-corruption law, but observers generally agree that its enforcement is very weak. The Anti-Corruption Law of 2003 (in Spanish) criminalises passive and active corruption (Art. 60, 61), extortion (Art. 63, 67) and money laundering. Furthermore, it establishes citizens' right to information and obligates the state to publish and make publicly available an account of public goods and expenses three times annually. However, the government does not publish expenditures in a detailed and timely fashion, and according to international observes, such information is difficult to obtain. The law requires public employees to present a sworn declaration of personal assets within 30 days of assuming a post as well as 30 days after leaving it. The law also allows for the extradition of corrupt officials, prohibits them from holding public office in the future and includes a prohibition on officials having secret foreign bank accounts. The Anti-Corruption Law also seeks to maximise penalties. For example, public officials found guilty in smaller corruption charges can receive sanctions ranging from 90 days suspension from office to removal from their position. Public officials found guilty of bribing or receiving commissions from foreign company representatives can be sentenced to between 10 and 20 years in prison. According to the OAS Inter-American Convention against Corruption Third Round Implementation Report 2010, the country's anti-corruption framework has a number of deficiencies, including absence of measures dealing with transnational bribery and embezzlement, as well as weak mechanisms of prevention of bribery of domestic and foreign government officials. Access the Lexadin World Law Guide for a collection of legislation in Venezuela. 

• Government Strategies: In principle, fighting corruption is a high priority for the Chávez administration, which is reflected in many of Chávez's speeches, by the creation of a solid legal framework and several public agencies mandated to deal with corruption. At the moment, the Ministry of Economy and Finance/SENIAT is running a 'Zero Tax Evasion' (in Spanish) campaign aimed at increasing Venezuelan tax revenues and reducing tax evasion and a 'Zero Contraband' (in Spanish) campaign intended to strengthen the Venezuelan customs system. However, apart from these initiatives and the creation of anti-corruption legislation and entities, the government's will towards genuinely curbing corruption has been questioned by several international observers and the political opposition. Moreover, the centralisation of power that occurred under Chavez's government has eliminated important checks and balances in the state system and thus enhanced Venezuela's overall vulnerability to corruption.

• Anti-Corruption Agencies: Three public agencies mandated to deal with corruption have been established under a public umbrella organisation called Poder Ciudadano (in Spanish), headed by the Moral Council of the Republic. These agencies are the Public Prosecutor, the Comptroller General and the Human Rights Ombudsman, which are all described in more detail below. Poder Ciudadano was created under the 1999 Constitution as the central political branch to coordinate the fight against corruption. The Organic Law of Poder Ciudadano (in Spanish) provides Poder Ciudadano (through its sub-agencies) with the authority to educate against, prevent, investigate and sanction 'acts against public ethics and moral', including corruption and non-transparency. Furthermore, the law establishes that the Poder Ciudadano and its sub-agencies are independent from other public agencies and that they enjoy functional, financial and administrative autonomy. However, Chávez has tried to interfere in the affairs of Poder Ciudadano by impeding the formulation of effective and clear responses to complaints about corruption submitted by civic organisations and political opposition parties. Also, Global Integrity 2009 reports that in practice the Venezuelan anti-corruption agencies are commonly influenced by political or personal incentives, including professional partnerships, personal loyalties, and abuses of power.

• General Public Prosecutor's Office: As one of the organs under Poder Ciudadano, the Fiscal General de la República (in Spanish) heads the Public Ministry, which is the central entity created to execute legal action under the state. Its main tasks are to handle criminal cases, including corruption. It also provides contact information for its representatives in each state to whom crimes can be reported to and who provide for the protection of victims of crime. Its website has several public services, including free hotlines for crime victims who need protection as well as a reporting mechanism to which criminal transgressions and corruption can be reported (see the 'Whistle-Blowing' section below). According to the US Department of State 2010, the independence of the Prosecutor General and its ability to conduct impartial investigations has been questioned by critics and civic groups. Similarly, according to the report, the office is allegedly not free from corruption.

• Comptroller General of the Republic: The Contraloría General de la República (in Spanish), as part of Poder Ciudadano, serves as a watchdog agency by controlling the revenues of and expenses incurred by the government. Although the agency is intended to be politically independent, observers cite that the staff are often appointed on the basis of cronyism and political clientelism. According to Global Integrity 2009, the Comptroller General's activity is in practice not protected from political interference, and the office is influenced by political and personal loyalties. Moreover, appointments to the Comptroller General are usually based on political considerations, and individuals appointed often have clear party loyalties. It is also indicated in the report that the office cannot compel the government to reveal sensitive information. The Comptroller General may sometimes lack powers to carry out its mandate, which may limit the office's effectiveness. Nevertheless, according to Global Integrity 2009, the government tends to act on the Comptroller General's reports. According to the US Department of State 2010, during 2010, the office administratively disqualified over 50 civil servants, including eight National Assembly candidates, as a result of allegations of misuse of public funds. However, at the same time, the media reported that seven current or former high-level government officials whom President Chavez had selected as candidates for the National Assembly had pending accusations of corruption in the Comptroller General's Office that had not been investigated, prosecuted, or sanctioned.

• Ombudsman: The Venezuelan Human Rights Ombudsman (in Spanish, Defensor del Pueblo) forms the third agency that makes up Poder Ciudadano. It is responsible for providing suitable legal instruments for the protection of fundamental rights and for compelling the government to adhere to the constitution and rule of law. According to Global Integrity 2009, although in law the Ombudsman is a politically independent institution, this is not the case in practice. Thus, according to the report, the current Ombudsman was an important member of a pro-Chávez party and became an MP thanks to the support from Chávez and his ruling party. Accordingly, the Ombudsman is a politicised institution, which may be sometimes overly compliant to the demands of the executive. According to Global Integrity 2009, the government usually ignores or only gives superficial attention to the Ombudsman's reports. In 2004, legislation expanded the powers of the Human Rights Ombudsman to include scrutiny of abuse of power and flaws in the provision of services.

• E-Governance: E-governance is relatively well-developed in Venezuela and practically all public ministries have web pages providing information on their work. For example, foreign investors may find relevant information on customs and tax regulations on the National Customs and Tax Administration Service (in Spanish, SENIAT - Servicio Nacional Integrado de Administracion Tributaria de Venezuela) website, which is headed by the Ministry of Economy and Finance.

• Public Procurement: In 2008, the government approved the Public Procurement Act (in Spanish) and repealed the 2001 Law of Tenders. In law, major procurements require competitive bidding, and strict formal requirements limit the extent of sole sourcing. However, in practice, the provision to ensure competitive bidding is not satisfactorily enforced, according to Global Integrity 2009. Transparency Venezuela has criticised the new public procurement law too for including even more exceptions to the principle of open tender, which has given reason for speculations that open bidding will be more the exception than the rule. The law, for example, does not apply to all contracts made in connection with international agreements of cooperation between Venezuela and other countries. Public tenders are publicised in newspapers and in the website of the contracting institution and of the National Contracting Service. Anyone wanting to participate in public tenders or sell to a Venezuelan governmental agency must be registered in the National Register of Contractors (in Spanish), which is maintained by the Central Office of Statistics and Informatics. The National Register can open sub-registers, normally found in all the ministries and governmental agencies which regularly purchase goods or services. In law, unsuccessful bidders can ask for an official review of the bidding process and challenge the concrete procurement decision in the courts. Nevertheless, according to Global Integrity 2009, the effectiveness of procurement processes could be questioned, as companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations, including bribery, are not effectively prohibited from participating in future procurement bids. The central government agency providing guidance to bidders and sellers is the National Contracting Service (in Spanish only). However, the best source of assistance to foreign companies with no previous experience in Venezuela may be Licitaciones Venezuela (in Spanish only), which is a private entity that provides practical information on the procurement environment in Venezuela.

• Whistle-Blowing: According to Global Integrity 2009, in practice, civil servants who report cases of corruption are not protected from recrimination or other negative consequences. As a signatory to the Inter-American Convention against Corruption, Venezuela has yet to enact a law protecting public sector whistleblowers along the lines set down in the Organisation of American States' model anti-corruption statutes. Furthermore, according to Global Integrity 2009, no law exists protecting private sector whistleblowers. Thus, whistleblowers may be punished through either official or unofficial means. The General Public Prosecutor's Office has a reporting mechanism on its website where it is stated that any person, victim or not, can report any illegal act. On the website, the link Denuncias (in Spanish only) contains information about how to report and to whom. Filing complaints to the General Public Prosecutor's Office cannot be done anonymously. The Human Rights Ombudsman's Office also has a reporting mechanism (in Spanish only) on its website to which complaints can be filed against the office's officials by e-mail and to which human rights violations and public service complaints can be reported.

• General Comments on the Public Anti-Corruption Initiatives: Both the executive and legislative branches have shown great interest in fighting corruption through public institutions, which is demonstrated by the creation of a comprehensive legislative framework and several agencies mandated to deal with cases of corruption. However, the effectiveness of the agencies has been deemed very low because of the high degree of executive interference in the agencies' affairs. Furthermore, observers generally agree that the Chávez administration has done little to clarify bureaucratic regulations or to reduce the number of direct contact points between public officials and citizens or companies that are known for increasing the possibility for corrupt behaviour. Despite promises to fight corruption, anti-corruption efforts have been sporadic, and there have only been a few high-profile convictions for corruption and embezzlement during Chávez's time in office. According to the US Department of State 2010 and Global Integrity 2009, the Anti-Corruption Law has not improved government transparency. Moreover, the centralisation of power that occurred under Chavez's government has eliminated important checks and balances in the state system and thus enhanced Venezuela's overall vulnerability to corruption.

• Media: The constitution guarantees freedom of expression. However, according to Freedom House 2010, exercising that right is difficult, especially after the passing of the 2004 Law on Social Responsibility of Radio and Television that gives the government authority to control the content of radio and television programmes. Furthermore, a 2004 Journalism Law provides for compulsory registration of journalists with the national journalism association and punishes reporters accused of 'illegal' conduct with prison sentences of up to six months. The so-called 'insult' laws (leyes de desacato) from 2005 increased penalties for insulting public authorities and makes it possible to imprison people for insulting 'by speech or in writing' the President, the Vice President, the President of the Legislature, the Chief Justice and numerous other government officials or for showing them 'lack of respect in any other way'. According to Human Rights Watch 2008, the 'insult' laws have often impeded investigative journalism on corruption cases, as the official accused in an article can sue the reporter for defamation. According to a January 2009 article by IPS, journalists investigating corruption and organised crime increasingly are victims of violence and killings, and self-censorship happens to a great extent. Investigative reporting on political corruption can also be at high risk, as exemplified by the case of journalist Gustavo Azocar. The US Department of State 2010 reports that Azocar was on trial for alleged illegal enrichment and was detained in July 2009 following his publication on the internet, in violation of a court gag order, of excerpts from his trial. Azocar claims, supported by the National College of Journalists and Reporters Without Borders, that his prosecution is politically motivated because of his reporting on corruption in the government and among the president's relatives. In May 2007, Chávez closed the only opposition television station and his government now controls three national television stations, eight radiobroadcasters, a state news agency, an international news channel and a daily newspaper, which all run pro-government ads. According to some observers, the strengthening of government control over the media can partly be seen as a reaction to the events prior to the military coup in April 2002, when several of the private opposition television stations had openly been highly critical towards the government and allegedly backed the instigators. All the above contributes to Venezuela's poor ranking in various media freedom indexes. For example, Freedom House 2010 assesses Venezuela's press environment as 'not free' and ranks the country 164th out of 196 countries, while Reporters Without Borders 2010 ranks Venezuela 124th out of 175 countries. For more information on the media environment in Venezuela, see the Human Rights Watch 2008 report: 'A Decade Under Chávez'.

• Civil Society: Many international observers as well as the Venezuelan political opposition believe that the Chávez government has weakened civil society in Venezuela. In 2000, the Supreme Tribunal of Justice ruled that NGOs with non-Venezuelan leaders or foreign government funding are not part of 'civil society'. As a result, they cannot represent citizens in court or bring their own legal actions. According to Freedom House 2010, the Chávez government has also undermined the legitimacy of human rights and other civil society organisations by questioning their relations to international groups. Furthermore, Amnesty International states that the lack of independence of the judiciary, harassment of human rights defenders and the use of administrative and tax proceedings restrict freedom of expression. Supporters of Chávez have sought to justify the marginalisation of some human rights and civil society groups by arguing that they are pursuing partisan agendas aimed at destabilising the country and removing Chávez from office. According to Human Rights Watch 2008, authorities in Venezuela have so far ignored, harassed or intimidated civil society groups on controversial issues, such as prison violence, rather than including them in policy discussions.

• Transparency Venezuela: Transparency Venezuela is the local chapter of Transparency International. It monitors and evaluates Venezuela's compliance with anti-corruption commitments made through the Inter-American Convention against Corruption and the United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). In Venezuela, civil society organisations (CSOs) are not allowed to receive foreign economic support. Thus, Transparency Venezuela's participation in the official monitoring process is not recognised by the government, since the NGO is internationally funded. Furthermore, Transparency Venezuela's critical 2006 report on the country's compliance with the Inter-American Convention against Corruption has been partly censored by the government. In fact, Human Rights Watch reports that the executive director of Transparency Venezuela was prevented from briefing the panel of Organisation of American States on the conclusions of the above report in mid-2007, after her appearance was vetoed by Venezuelan officials. Transparency Venezuela won the 2007 Changemakers Ending Corruption: Honesty Instituted competition for its 'Municipios Transparentes' (Transparent Municipalities) project, a group of programmes aimed at strengthening the capacities of the local governments and citizen and community organisations in matters related to the struggle against corruption.

The websites listed below provide useful facts on Venezuela as well as contacts and tools for companies operating in Venezuela:

• International Finance Corporation: Latin America & the Caribbean SME Toolkit (in Spanish)
  Guide to sustainable business management practices for SMEs.
• Business Fighting Corruption
  An online resource centre for business on collective action to avoid corruption, which contains a guide and resources for partnerships with companies and other stakeholders to fight against corruption.
• CIA World Factbook: Venezuela Profile
• World Bank: Venezuela Data Profile

Sources for further reading:

• US Department of State: Investment Climate Statement - Venezuela 2011.
• US Department of State: Human Rights Report - Venezuela 2010.
• Freedom House: Freedom in the World - Venezuela 2010.
• The Bertelsmann Foundation: Transformation Index - Venezuela 2010.
• Global Integrity: Venezuela Country Report 2009.

UNCAC Status: Signed 10 December 2003. Ratified 2 February 2009.

Status on UNCAC Implementation
This field describes the country's status on the United Nations Convention against Corruption. Please note any declarations and reservations made upon ratification. The list of signatories can be found on the UNODC website. Read more about the UNCAC.

Other Relevant Conventions or Treaties:

• Inter-American Convention against Corruption: Signed 22 May 1997. Ratified 2 June 1997.
  Read Transparency International's summary and assessment of the convention.
• United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime: Signed 14 December 2000. Ratified 13 May 2002.
  Read Transparency International's summary and assessment of the convention.

Transparency CPI: 2011: 172/182 (Score: 1.9)

Transparency CPI
This field consists of the score for the country in question on the Corruption Perceptions Index from Transparency International as well as its ranking.

World Bank CORR Index (-2.5 - +2.5): 2010: - 1.9

World Bank Corruption Index
This field consists of the score for the country in question on the 'Control of Corruption' indicator in the World Bank Governance Research Indicator Country Snapshot (GRICS): 1996-2010.

OECD Country Risk Classification (0-7): 2011: 7

Country Risk Classification
The classification of countries by risk category has the aim of providing OECD countries with a basis for calculating the premium interest rate to be charged to cover the risk of non-repayment of export credits. Countries are placed in risk categories 0 - 7, with 0 being the lowest risk category and thus the least expensive. Conversely, premium group 7 is the highest risk category. Each classification is comprised of 2 components: 1) an assessment of the country's economic/financial situation, and 2) its overall political stability. Access the complete list of OECD Country Risk Classification figures.

Data Verification:

Publication date: June 2011

Data verified by: Global Advice Network

General Information Sources

• The World Bank & IFC: Doing Business 2011.
• US Department of State: Investment Climate Statement - Venezuela 2011.
• World Economic Forum: The Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011.
• US Department of State: Human Rights Report - Venezuela 2010.
• Transparency International: Global Corruption Barometer 2010.
• Freedom House: Freedom in the World - Venezuela 2010.
• OAS Inter-American Convention against Corruption: Third Round Implementation Report 2010.
• The Bertelsmann Foundation: Transformation Index - Venezuela 2010.
• Transparency International: Global Corruption Barometer 2009.
• Transparency International: Global Corruption Report 2009.
• Global Integrity: Venezuela Country Report 2009.
• Herald Tribune: Chavez Recalls Venezuela Ambassador to Peru after Garcia Grants Political Asylum to Opposition Leader', 5 may 2009.
• Reuters: 'Venezuelans protest bid to arrest opposition leader', 20 March 2009.
• Latinobarómetro: Annual Report 2008 (see English version).
• La Vanguardia: 'La Físcalia acusa de corrupción a un segundo ex gobernador antichavista', 18 December 2008.
• Lexadin: The World Law Guide - Legislation Venezuela 2008.
• US Department of State: Investment Climate Statement - Venezuela 2008.
• Bloomberg: 'Chavez Ambitions in Venezuela May Fade With Oil Price', 27 October 2008.
• BBC News: Country Profile Venezuela, July 2008.
• BBC News: 'Chavez agrees to change 'spy' law', 8 June 2008.
• Latinobarómetro: Annual Report 2007 (see English version).
• BBC News: 'Venezuela Waits for Reform Result', 3 December 2007.
• The New York Times: 'Venezuela Hands Narrow Defeat to Chavez Plan', 3 December 2007.
• Time: 'Why Venezuelans Turned on Chavez', 3 December 2007.
• The New York Times: 'Why I Parted with Chavez', 1 December 2007.
• The Economist.com: 'A Warning for Reformers', 15 November 2007.
• BBC: 'Nationalisation sweeps Venezuela', 15 May 2007.
• USA Today: 'Is Hugo Chávez Mr. Misunderstood?', April 2007.
• The World Bank & IFC: Enterprise Surveys 2006.
• Latinobarómetro: Annual Report 2006 (see English version).
• The New York Times: 'For Venezuela, a Treasure in Oil Sludge', 1 June 2006.
• NewsMax.com: 'Venezuela's Chavez Caught in 'Culture of Corruption'', 31 March 2006.
• Latinobarómetro: Annual Report 2005 (see English version).
• Transparencia Venezuela: Informe Nacional: Venezuela Contrataciones Públicas 2004 (in Spanish).

Corruption Levels Sources

Judicial System

• The World Bank & IFC: Doing Business 2011.
• US Department of State: Investment Climate Statement - Venezuela 2011.
• World Economic Forum: The Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011.
• US Department of State: Human Rights Report - Venezuela 2010.
• Transparency International: Global Corruption Barometer 2010.
• Freedom House: Freedom in the World - Venezuela 2010.
• The Bertelsmann Foundation: Transformation Index - Venezuela 2010.
• The US Department of State: Human Rights Report - Venezuela 2009.
• Transparency International: Global Corruption Barometer 2009.
• Associated Press: 'Jailing of judge provokes debate in Venezuela', 15 December 2009.
• El Universal: 'Ex Attorney General is the new Venezuelan Ambassador to Spain', 8 June 2009.
• Latinobarómetro: Annual Report 2008 (see English version).
• Latinobarómetro: Annual Report 2007 (see English version).
• The World Bank & IFC: Enterprise Surveys 2006.
• Fairchild, Gary F. et al.: A Primer on Exporting to Venezuela, University of Florida 2005.
• Human Rights Watch: Questions and Answers about Venezuela's Court-Packing Law, 2004.
• USAID: Venezuela and Corruption 2003.

Police

• World Economic Forum: The Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011.
• US Department of State: Human Rights Report - Venezuela 2010.
• Transparency International: Global Corruption Barometer 2010.
• Freedom House: Freedom in the World - Venezuela 2010.
• The US Department of State: Human Rights Report - Venezuela 2009.
• Global Integrity: Venezuela Country Report 2009.
• Human Rights Watch: World Report - Venezuela 2009.
• Transparency International: Global Corruption Barometer 2009.
• The Guardian: 'Deadly force. Venezuela's police have become a law unto themselves', 6 September 2009.
• Latinobarómetro: Annual Report 2008.
• The World Bank & IFC: Enterprise Surveys 2006.
• USAID: Venezuela and Corruption 2003.

Licences, Infrastructure and Public Utilities

• The World Bank & IFC: Doing Business 2011.
• US Department of State: Investment Climate Statement - Venezuela 2011.
• World Economic Forum: The Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011.
• US Department of State: Human Rights Report - Venezuela 2010.
• Transparency International: Global Corruption Barometer 2010.
• The Wall Street Journal: 'Critic of Chávez Gets 8-Year Prison Sentence', 9 May 2010.
• Transparency International: Global Corruption Barometer 2009.
• Global Integrity: Venezuela Country Report 2009.
• World Economic Forum: Benchmarking National Attractiveness for Private Investment in Latin American Infrastructure 2007.
• The World Bank & IFC: Enterprise Surveys 2006.
• Coronel, Gustavo & CATO Institute: Corruption, Mismanagement, and Abuse of Power in Hugo Chávez's Venezuela, 2006.
• NewsMax.co: 'Venezuela's Chávez Caught in 'Culture of Corruption'', 31 March 2006.
• Global Integrity: Venezuela Country Report 2004.

Land Administration

• The World Bank & IFC: Doing Business 2011.
• US Department of State: Investment Climate Statement - Venezuela 2011.
• World Economic Forum: The Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011.
• US Department of State: Human Rights Report - Venezuela 2010.
• The Bertelsmann Foundation: Transformation Index - Venezuela 2010.
• Transparency International: Global Corruption Barometer 2010.
• Transparency International: Global Corruption Barometer 2009.
• Human Rights Watch: World Report - Venezuela 2007.
• World Economic Forum: Benchmarking National Attractiveness for Private Investment in Latin American Infrastructure 2007.
• The New York Times: 'Clash of Hope and Fear as Venezuela Seizes Land', 17 May 2007.
• Defenfor del Pueblo/Human Rights Ombudsman: Defensor del Pueblo entregó informe sobre violencia en el campo, 5 May 2006 (in Spanish).
• Transparency International: Global Corruption Report 2005.

Tax Administration

• The World Bank & IFC: Doing Business 2011.
• US Department of State: Investment Climate Statement - Venezuela 2011.
• Transparency International: Global Corruption Barometer 2010.
• OAS Inter-American Convention against Corruption: Third Round Implementation Report 2010.
• Transparency International: Global Corruption Barometer 2009.
• Global Integrity: Venezuela Country Report 2009.
• The World Bank & IFC: Enterprise Surveys 2006.
• Latinobarómetro: Annual Report 2006 (see English version).
• USAID: Venezuela and Corruption 2003.

Customs Administration

• The World Bank & IFC: Doing Business 2011.
• World Economic Forum: The Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011.
• Transparency International: Global Corruption Barometer 2010.
• World Economic Forum: Global Enabling Trade Report 2010.
• Global Integrity: Venezuela Country Report 2009.
• US Department of State: Investment Climate Statement - Venezuela 2008.
• The World Bank & IFC: Enterprise Surveys 2006.
• Globovision: 'Roberto Smith denuncia diez casos de corrupción en la que estarían incursos funcionarios de Aduanas y el Seniat', 13 November 2006.
• Transparency International: Global Corruption Barometer 2005.
• Global Integrity: Venezuela Country Report 2004.
• Joaquin Vial: Foreign Investment in the Andean Countries, CID Working Paper No. 85, January 2002.

Public Procurement and Contracting

• US Department of State: Investment Climate Statement - Venezuela 2011.
• World Economic Forum: The Global Competitiveness Report 2010-2011.
• Global Integrity: Venezuela Country Report 2009.
• The Bertelsmann Foundation: Transformation Index - Venezuela 2008.
• NewsMax.co: 'Venezuela's Chávez Caught in 'Culture of Corruption'', 31 March 2006.
• Coronel, Gustavo & CATO Institute: Corruption, Mismanagement, and Abuse of Power in Hugo Chávez's Venezuela, 2006.
• Transparency Venezuela: Informe Nacional: Venezuela Contrataciones Públicas 2004 (in Spanish).
• Global Integrity: Venezuela Country Report 2004.

Environment, Natural Resources and Extractive Industry

• Global Integrity: Venezuela Country Report 2009.
• Newsweek: 'A question of graft', 31 July 2006.
• Coronel, Gustavo & CATO Institute: Corruption, Mismanagement, and Abuse of Power in Hugo Chavez's Venezuela, 2006.
• Transparency International: Global Corruption Report 2006.
• Save the Children UK: Beyond the Rhetoric: Measuring revenue transparency: company performance in the oil and gas industries 2005.
• Latin Trade: A royal mess: as commodity prices zoom, governments are raising - even creating - royalties on foreign mining and petroleum companies, June 2005.
• Transparencia Venezuela: Informe Nacional: Venezuela Contrataciones Públicas 2004 (in Spanish).

Public Anti-Corruption Initiatives Sources

• US Department of State: Investment Climate Statement - Venezuela 2011.
• US Department of State: Human Rights Report - Venezuela 2010.
• OAS Inter-American Convention against Corruption: Third Round Implementation Report 2010.
• Freedom House: Freedom in the World - Venezuela 2010.
• Global Integrity: Venezuela Country Report 2009.
• Freedom House: Freedom in the World - Venezuela 2008.
• Lexadin: The World Law Guide - Legislation Venezuela 2008.
• Coronel, Gustavo & Cato Institute: Corruption, Mismanagement, and Abuse of Power in Hugo Chávez's Venezuela, 2006.
• Transparency International: Global Corruption Report 2006.
• Transparencia Venezuela: Informe Nacional: Venezuela Contrataciones Públicas 2004 (in Spanish).
• Venezuelanalysis: 'Debate on the Legitimacy and Effectiveness of the Chavez Government', 23 December 2003.

Private Anti-Corruption Initiatives Sources

• US Department of State: Human Rights Report - Venezuela 2010.
• Reporters Without Borders: Venezuela Country Report 2010.
• Freedom House: Freedom in the World - Venezuela 2010.
• Freedom House: Freedom of the Press Index 2010.
• Freedom House: Freedom of the Press - Venezuela 2009.
• US Department of State: Human Rights Report - Venezuela 2009.
• Reporters Without Borders: Worldwide Press Freedom Index 2009.
• IPS: 'Journalists Face Escalation of Violence', January 21 2009.
• Human Rights Watch: A Decade Under Chávez - Political Intolerance andLost Opportunities for Advancing Human Rights in Venezuela, 2008.
• Transparency International Press Release: Venezuelan government blocks civil society participation at the OAS, 2007.
• Amnesty International: 'Freedom of Expression in Danger' 10 May 2007.
• Transparency International: 'Venezuelan Government Blocks Civil Society Participation at the OAS', 27 June 2007.
• Transparency International: Global Corruption Report 2006.
• Reporters Without Borders: New Law a Threat to Journalists' Rights, 30 July 2004.